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ALLOCATING THE ROLES FOR
CONTRACTS AND JUDGES IN THE
CLOSELY HELD FIRM
ROBERT B. THOMPSON*
INTRODUCTION
When cases continue to be debated decades after they were
decided it is usually because of how they changed the law at the
time of the decision and/or because of what they contribute to
resolving new legal problems arising in the current period.1 This
Article uses those two benchmarks to analyze Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc. 2 and its immediate precedent from the prior
year, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 3 Looking at these cases in
the context of the changes to the law at the time they were decided
(the focus of Part I below), their most lasting impact was not on the
equal opportunity principle, or de facto dividend regulation, or
even partnership fiduciary duty rules, but on how they changed the
dominant legal framework for viewing the closely held firm. In
deed the primary change following those cases has been in the legis
lative and judicial embracing of a greater role for judicial
involvement as opposed to just leaving parties to their own con
tracting as the preferred legal response to address the specific pre
dicament of investors in a closely held firm.
The particular legal remedy in those cases, an enhanced fiduci
ary duty among participants in a closely held corporation, is only
one of five that have developed since then as widely accepted legal
principles in this area.4 The other four—statutes providing judges
* Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University.
1. There are additional reasons, of course, one of which would be the descriptive
power of the language, for example Meinhard v. Salmon’s “punctilio” standard. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). That case probably meets all three
predictors for longevity. See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Story of Meinhard v.
Salmon: Fiduciary Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES (J. Mark Ramseyer
ed. 2009).
2. See generally Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass.
1976).
3. See generally Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
4. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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with authority to grant involuntary dissolution for oppressive or
similar acts in the corporation,5 reasonable expectations as the most
widely accepted standard to trigger such judicial relief,6 buyout at a
judicially determined fair price as the preferred remedy for such
violations,7 and permitting minority owners to sue for breach of fi
duciary duty in a direct, individual action as opposed to a derivative
claim8—have each achieved even broader consensus than the en
hanced fiduciary duty holding of Donahue and Wilkes.9 Together
the five developments reflect a legislative and judicial recognition
of the predicament that minority investors find themselves when
there has been a falling out among the participants in an intimate,
illiquid enterprise characterized by centralized control and perma
nence. They also reflect legislative and judicial recognition that
contracting alone is an insufficient response to the reality exper
ienced by such an investor so that the possibility (albeit not the
guarantee) of judicial relief is a beneficial legal rule to be provided
by the state.
Part II explores the extent to which investors in limited liability
companies (LLCs), a new form of organizing a closely held firm
that was not available at the time of Donahue and Wilkes, face a
parallel dilemma. The intimacy of the relationship in most LLCs
and the multiple connections of the participants to the business are
often as true in the LLC as they are in the close corporation. LLC
rules have replicated the illiquidity and permanence of the corpora
tion in a closely held setting. The menu of possible responses is the
same, including contracting or judicial relief. LLC proponents see
contracting as something fundamentally different in the LLC as op
posed to the close corporation, but this is a path the law of the
closely held firm has been down before. In fact, the LLC con
tracting debate looks a lot like the close corporations law reform
discussions of the 1950s and 1960s, before Donahue, when con
tracting was seen as the preferred solution for the worries of a mi
5. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (2005).
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 (West 2004).
7. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(e).
8. See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Op
pression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993).
9. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 382 (2004) (asserting even the most generous interpretation cannot trans
form the Massachusetts law of fiduciary duties in close corporations into anything re
sembling a true majority rule). However, even fiduciary duty has done better than
Professor Siegel suggests. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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nority investor in the closely held firm.10 Thus, the guidance of
Donahue and Wilkes will be relevant as legislatures and courts
again have to address whether contracting is now better equipped
to address the limits of bounded rationality and other aspects of the
human condition such that the judicial involvement provided in the
five strands of close corporation law reform are no longer necessary
in the twenty-first century.
I. CHANGING THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CLOSELY HELD
BUSINESS FIRMS CIRCA 1976
Donahue and Wilkes were at the center of a fundamental re
orientation in how American law defines the roles for contracting
and judges in shaping the governance relationship of participants
within closely held corporations. Subpart A begins with a discus
sion of the traditional corporate attributes that have long defined
corporations and the problems created for a closely held business in
such a legal regime. Subpart B briefly covers possible remedies that
would be available in such a context including self-help, contractual
protections, and relief from a judge. Subpart C addresses the cor
porate law environment for closely held businesses as it existed at
the time the cases were brought, how the cases changed the law,
and how the law developed in the time thereafter. It turns out that
the courts’ framing of the problem was more important than the
particular solution provided in these cases. What we take away
from Donahue and Wilkes should be more about the distinctive ap
proach to the role of contracts and courts and less as to the specific
remedy.
A.

The Predicament of Minority Investors in a Closely Held
Corporation

The holdings of Donahue and Wilkes were a judicial recogni
tion of the disconnect between the traditional corporate attributes,
found in the statutes and the common law of the fifty states, and the
realities of a closely held business relationship. The usual corporate
attributes reflect the needs of a publicly held corporation. For ex
ample, corporations statutes provide for the separation and special
ization of function (and the various efficiencies that may come from
such specialization) among shareholders as the providers of capital,
officers as the day-to-day managers, and directors as the monitors
10.

See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
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and ultimate authority in making business decisions.11 The central
ized control of all corporate powers in the board of directors, the
core of corporate governance law, permits an efficiency that will be
most useful to a large, sprawling business enterprise. Entity perma
nence, continuing beyond the death or withdrawal of any one par
ticipant, permits the entity to make long-term plans without having
to hold capital aside to redeem shares of individual investors. Judi
cial deference to the private ordering within the corporation and to
the decisions of the centralized majoritarian bodies, deference most
visible in the business judgment rule,12 similarly reduces the ability
of individual investors to interfere with the centralized decisions.
Free transferability and limited liability permits the development of
public markets. In turn, these markets provide a source of liquidity
from outside the corporate structure that lessens the lock-in effect
of permanence and provides constraints on the possible excesses of
centralized control.
In the context of a closely held business, however, these corpo
rate norms have markedly different effects because the relationship
is both intimate and illiquid. Illustrating the first characteristic, the
closely held firm is often both a vehicle for investment of the par
ticipant’s money capital and human capital. Shareholders in a
closely held firm often expect to be employed and have a meaning
ful role in management as well as a return on their investment.13
Decisions vitally important to participants, such as their employ
ment, are controlled by the majority shareholders through the
board. When harmony between participants disappears, a common
occurrence given the human condition, those with the levers of con
trol in the corporation can terminate employment, deny dividends,
or force the minority out of the business on terms set by the major
ity. The harm can be more intense given that in many closely held
firms, there are familial relationships or other long-term personal
relationships that are at risk in addition to the investment and em
ployment relationship.14
11. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §§ 7.28, 8.01, 8.41 (2005) (describing rights
of shareholders, directors, and officers). See generally CHARLES R. O’KELLEY & ROB
ERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASE AND
MATERIALS 153 (6th ed. 2010).
12. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
13. See, e.g., F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORA
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.07 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE].
14. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 701.
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The economic reality of the absence of a public market for the
entity’s shares deprives investors in the closely held firm of the
same liquidity and ability to adapt available to investors in a public
corporation. The permanence of the corporate form further com
pounds the dilemma. Without a job, and in the absence of divi
dends, the minority shareholder may face an indefinite future with
no return, financial or otherwise, on the contributions made to the
enterprise.
B. The Menu of Possible Responses to Such a Predicament
The predicament just described arises within a legal entity that
combines centralized control/majority rule with entity permanence
and the lack of an exit, so that a minority investor, after a falling
out, faces the possibility of no money forever (or at least until the
majority relents, or the minority gives up, or the parties are able to
reach a resolution among themselves). There are a variety of possi
ble responses one might take, or tell others to take, in trying to plan
so as to not be caught in such a situation. One approach is to
choose wisely in co-venturers. Another would be to work harder at
relationships, to keep small squabbles from festering and growing.
Such approaches have always been necessary in general partner
ships given the unlimited liability that can arise from actions of
one’s partners and the practical loss to all partners that can occur
when intimate relationships in a small enterprise break down.
A second set of ex ante steps would be to structure the rela
tionship so both parties would have sufficient incentives to work for
the common good and not pursue opportunistic conduct. This is
most easily done in a 50/50 venture or where both parties have sep
arate inputs that the enterprise needs. When buying a minority po
sition, the task becomes more difficult, but the Delaware Supreme
Court has pointed to “tools of good corporate practice” by which
minority shareholders “may enter into definitive . . . agreements”
that “may provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out provisions,
voting trusts or other voting agreements.”15 Such contracting has
long been part of the planning that practitioners undertake in the
close corporation relationship.
Beyond such self-help, participants could look to other dispute
resolution devices, such as family ties or by appealing to the norms
15.

Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).
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of groups to which the co-venturers belong.16 Dispute resolution
could also be specified by contracts (including e.g. arbitration or
automatic dissolution) or could be provided by the state by author
izing a judge to put limits on permanence via an ordering of invol
untary dissolution or finding a breach of fiduciary duty.17
One other response might be termed the Henny Youngman so
lution, reflecting one of the stand-up comedian’s recurring one lin
ers set up by a patient complaining to the doctor of a particular
pain, and the doctor’s simple advice: “Then don’t do that!”18 In a
similar vein, would a savvy investor avoid a legal entity that pro
duces such results in favor of one such as a partnership, which pro
vides for shared governance, relatively easy exit, and a judiciallyenforced fiduciary duty? Why then would any non-majority inves
tor choose to do business in the corporate form? The answer is that
the choice of business form has been made in the context in which
three separate decisions are bundled. When selecting a business
form one simultaneously gets a liability rule as to non-participants,
a tax status as to the government, and a governance relationship
among co-venturers.
Participants are not indifferent to what they want from a busi
ness form—the magic answers to the three relationships in the bun
dle are limited liability as to outsiders, the lowest taxes as to the
government, and usually some sort of shared governance as to the
relationship with co-venturers.19 At the time of Donahue/Wilkes,
and as had been true for most of the twentieth century until that
point, the corporation was the dominant business form to provide
limited liability and still provide a lower tax bill.20 Since the corpo
16. See, for example, the law merchant discussed in HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 15 (3d ed. 1983).
17. See infra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
18. Henny Youngman Jokes: Doctor Jokes, FUNNY2.COM, http://www.funny2.
com/henny.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
19. See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of the Limited Liability Companies, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 925 (1995).
20. Until 1982, the highest individual tax rate always exceeded the highest corpo
rate tax rate. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 299-305 (5th ed. 1987).
For example, in 1942, the highest individual rate was 88% while the rate in the top
corporate bracket was 40%. Id. at 313, 321. This created an incentive to use the corpo
rate form if a double tax could be avoided when the corporate earnings were distributed
to participants and if other tax provisions (for example, basis rules, deductions, exemp
tions) did not eliminate the advantage from the rate differential. Other business forms
such as the Massachusetts Business Trust could possibly provide the combination de
pending on the state’s approach to limited liability. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 8(a)
(repealed 2008).
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rate rate had long been lower than the individual rate an owner
could retain within the corporate treasury any income produced by
the business that was not needed by the participants’ immediate
needs, pay the lower corporate income tax rate, and, if you did your
planning correctly, eventually get the remaining sums out of the
corporation without paying a second corporate level tax by coming
under the General Utilities doctrine.21
These two immediate benefits, lower taxes and avoiding liabil
ity to outsiders, dominated the third (governance) area of inquiry.
Academics and lawyers, as discussed below, focused on the power
of contracts to address any adjustments that needed to be made in
the relations among co-venturers, including adjusting rules as to
centralized control, majority rule, and permanence.22 But parties
were not always sure they wanted to spend money (that otherwise
could be used to build the nascent business) to engage in elaborate
planning. Like couples contemplating marriage, parties entering
into a closely held business relationship failed to adequately plan
for what would happen if they had a falling out. As with marriage,
even raising the issue could adversely impinge on the trust thought
necessary to make the relationship work.
C. Viewing 1975/1976 as a Fulcrum in Corporate Law’s
Approach to the Closely Held Firm
A more particular view of the world of close corporations at
the time of the Donahue and Wilkes decision in 1975 and 1976 is
also a necessary foundation for understanding the changes the cases
brought about. For most of the history of American corporate law
up until that time, statutes and judicial decisions laid down the same
rule for governance of both publicly-held and close corporations.23
In the period after World War II,24 scholars such as F. Hodge
21. Under the General Utilities doctrine, the corporation’s distribution of appre
ciated property to its shareholders did not cause the corporation to realize taxable gain,
thus avoiding a tax at the corporate level. See General Utils. & Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) (1954). The Tax Reform Act of 1986
§ 631 eliminated the General Utilities doctrine. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 631, 26
U.S.C. § 337 (2006). To avoid a tax at the individual level it was common to zero out
corporate income by paying out salaries. See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of the
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 929-30 (1995).
22. See infra note 104.
23. F. HODGE O’NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 27 (1958).
24. There was some earlier writing. See generally Norman Winer, Proposing a
New York “Close Corporation Law”, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943).
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O’Neal,25 Elvin Latty,26 George Hornstein,27 and Carlos Israels28
described the differences between public and close corporations
and urged changes in the law. Many of these early efforts were
devoted to gaining increased room for contracting for participants
in close corporations to avoid the unwanted rules that made the
public corporation form worrisome.29 Thus, statutes permitted
charter or bylaw provisions providing unanimity or supermajority
requirements that provided participants a veto over corporate ac
tion.30 Other statutory changes loosened formalities31 and provided
for charter provisions that permitted dissolution at will.32 Scholars
and legislators of this period expressed belief in contracting similar
to that expressed by the modern day proponents of LLCs.33 In the
decade before Donahue and Wilkes, many states had passed special
statutes dealing with the close corporation that again were focused
on broadened freedom of contracting.34 The first two editions of
O’Neal’s landmark Close Corporations treatise, which had been
published prior to the Massachusetts decisions, focused on agree
ments that would navigate around unwanted public corporation
25. O’Neal was dean at three law schools—Mercer, Duke, and Washington Uni
versity—and also taught at Vanderbilt and the University of Mississippi. F. Hodge
O’Neal, 73, Ex-Law School Dean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/
1991/01/24/obituaries/f-hodge-o-neal-73-ex-law-school-dean.html.
26. Latty was dean at Duke Law School and was an important figure in the draft
ing of the North Carolina corporations law changes in 1956, a key statutory change in
the 1950’s. See E.R. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Busi
ness Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REV. 432, 438 (1956).
27. See generally George Hornstein, Stockholders’ Agreements in the Closely Held
Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1951).
28. See generally Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 COR
NELL L.Q. 488 (1948).
29. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 238 (N.Y. 1934) (refusing to
enforce a contract that interfered with the unfettered discretion of directors to run the
corporation).
30. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 1, 9 (1948) (adding section 9 authorizing charter
provisions establishing a high quorum or vote requirement).
31. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:18 (Rev. 3d ed., 2010)
[hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS] (discussing
statute).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1973) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14
30(2) (2009)).
33. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, Ribstein and Keatinge on
Limited Liability Companies § 1.2, at 2 (1998); Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman,
Delaware Limited Liability Companies, in DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSI
NESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.4 (R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., 1998); see
also infra note 129 and accompanying text.
34. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note
31, §§ 1:15-1:19.
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characteristics and suggested changes in law to permit such
actions.35
Another O’Neal project of this period had categorized the vo
luminous ways that a minority shareholder could be oppressed or
squeezed out in a closely held firm. This initial Oppression/Squeeze
Out volume, published in 1961, included dozens of sections itemiz
ing the causes of squeeze outs and then two more chapters describ
ing the techniques used to squeeze out before detailing methods to
avoid squeeze out and ideas for changes in legal rules.36 This was a
“Brandeis brief” spelling out the close corporation predicament and
it spread through O’Neal’s other works. The 260-page paperback
published in 1961 tripled by the time it was published in hardback
in 1975.37 Key ideas were incorporated as part of the close corpora
tion treatise.38 As a regular practice O’Neal wrote to the lawyers in
every published close corporation and oppression case; thus, it is
not surprising that he wrote and talked to Mr. Egan, the lawyer for
Mr. Wilkes.39
But even here, the focus was on contracts and other arrange
ments to avoid squeeze outs, and legislative changes that would
permit such planning. There had been involuntary dissolution stat
utes based on oppression since the early 1930s40 and such a provi
sion had been included in the Model Business Corporation Act
from the earliest inception of that project in the 1940s.41 The first
edition of the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, pub
lished in 1960, reports fourteen states with statutes that authorized
35. See generally F. HODGE O’NEAL, supra note 23; F. HODGE O’NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972)].
36. F. HODGE O’NEAL & JORDAN DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSI
NESS ASSOCIATES: SQUEEZE-OUTS IN SMALL ENTERPRISES, ch. 3-5 (1961) [hereinafter
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES].
37. See generally F. HODGE O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHARE
HOLDERS EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1975) [hereinafter
“SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS].
38. F. HODGE O’NEAL, supra note 23; CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972), supra note 35.
39. Interview with Jack Egan, son of David Egan, in Springfield, Mass. (Oct. 15,
2010).
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 308, § 351 (1933); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 364, 429
(1933). California had a similar law from 1931 to 1933. See Henry W. Ballentine, A
Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 392
(1934).
41. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48
BUS. LAW. 699, 709 n. 68 (1993) (reporting early history).
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courts to order involuntary dissolution for oppression,42 and by the
time of the second edition—a decade or so later—the number of
states had grown to twenty-four.43 That number, however, over
states the reach of the remedy. Any relief required a judicial order
and most judges still felt that killing a corporation was not some
thing they should do.44 Oppression was not defined in the statute
and courts were not ready to give it a broad reach. Baker v. Com
mercial Body Builders, an early Oregon decision, outlined a long
list of possible remedies under the Oregon statute, but its definition
of oppression, viewed from a twenty-first century perspective, looks
narrow.45
Case precedent at the time was stronger from abroad than
from the United States. The United Kingdom had enacted an op
pression remedy in 194846 and there were some early cases that pro
vided for broader interpretations of relief and remedies.47 Allen
Afterman, an Australian scholar writing in an American law review,
linked oppression in the United Kingdom and other commonwealth
statutes to conduct that frustrated participants’ reasonable expecta

42. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 90 (1st ed. 1960) (listing six states with laws sub
stantially similar to the Model Act’s provisions, two as basically similar, four using “un
fairness” to the minority, and three closely resembling, one of which was also included
in the prior category).
43. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 97 (2d ed. 1969) (listing seven states with identical
laws or at least laws identical in substance; thirteen with comparable laws (one of which
omits oppression and is excluded from this count); three substantially similar to oppres
sion; and two phrased as when necessary to protect the rights of a substantial number of
shareholders).
44. See, for example, cases from states with seemingly broad statutes, Bator v.
United Sausage Co., 81 A.2d 442, 444 (Conn. 1951) (“Dissension . . . not a ground for
dissolution unless it goes so far as to render it impossible to carry on the corporate
affairs.” (citing Olechny v. Thadeus Kosciuszko Soc’y, 24 A.2d 249 (1942))); Polikoff v.
Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (“[T]he remedy of
[dissolution] is so drastic that it must be invoked with extreme caution.”).
45. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393-95 (Or. 1973)
(defining oppression by reference to a visible departure from the standards of fair deal
ing, but including no specific reference to reasonable expectations and other terms that
have become more common since).
46. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210 (Eng).
47. See, e.g., Meyer v. Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society, [1958] S.C. 3 (H.L.) 66
(appeal taken from Scot.) (providing relief to a minority shareholder under section
210); In re H.R. Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 3 A.L. 689 (appeal taken from Scot.) (finding
relief under section 210 where father’s behavior oppressive); Ebrahimi v. Westbourne
Galleries Ltd., [1972] A.C. 2 (H.L.) 1289 (appeal taken from Eng.) (permitting winding
up under section 222; permitting relief based on broad grounds based on the partici
pants overall relationship in the company).
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tions, heralding what has become a dominant trend in American
case law.48
Fiduciary duty, likewise, was a possible source of relief, but one
that minority shareholders could not regularly rely on in a squeezeout setting and one that reform advocates had not chosen to make
their primary argument. O’Neal wrote in 1958, in the first edition
of his close corporations treatise, that there was support for using
fiduciary duty: “many of the older decisions and practically all of
the recent ones indicate that controlling shareholders, in some cir
cumstances at least, owe fiduciary duties to minority sharehold
ers.”49 He repeated that same statement in new versions of the
Close Corporation and Oppression treatises in 1972 and 1975 ad
ding additional case illustrations.50 In the Oppression treatises, he
summarized the impact this way:
In spite of the principles of majority rule and the business judg
ment rule, the courts in this country are moving steadily, though
slowly and often clumsily and gropingly, to provide a remedy for
oppressed minority shareholders. This they are doing principally
by imposing a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders and cor
porate directors for the benefit of minority interests, and by grad
ually expanding the scope of that fiduciary duty.51

A principal reason for all those adverb qualifiers in the last
O’Neal description was judicial deference to business decisions.
O’Neal described it as a too eager willingness to invoke the busi
ness judgment rule.52 This, in turn, arose from the ambiguity as to
fiduciary duty in the closely held firm; if there were no fiduciary
duty in a particular context, there would be no judicial involvement.
One prominent article of the period observed that
[I]t is clear that controlling shareholders are not fiduciaries in the
strict sense; and indeed they could not be, for the classic fiduciary
concept is incompatible with the principle that the stockholder
majorities shall effectively govern. However, the vocabulary and
48. See generally Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority
Shareholders: A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969).
49. CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 13, at 108.
50. CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972), supra note 35, at
45; “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 37, at 508.
51. EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, supra note 36, § 8.02
at 194; “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 37, at 584.
52. Id. § 8.02, at 192, 194 (calling for judicial discrimination in applying the busi
ness judgment rule in close corporations).
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some of the content of the law of fiduciaries are employed to deal
with instances of oppression.53

An important close corporation symposium of the period
noted that “[t]he application of the term ‘fiduciary’ to the majority’s
duty towards the minority is of little value because of the difficulty
of reconciling the majority’s trust obligation with his right of selfish
ownership.”54 Here is the governor on unregulated application of
fiduciary duty and the antecedent for Wilkes use of the “selfish
ownership” concept to address the same conflict.
What Donahue and Wilkes did was link the close corporation
predicament to a fiduciary duty remedy that was more likely to be
employed in a close corporation setting without the same uncer
tainty of the prior case law. They broke through the deference of
the business judgment rule in the same way that the Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. decision did a decade later in the takeover
context.55 There defensive tactics taken by a target board in the
face of a takeover did not evidence the obvious self-dealing (such as
directors on the opposite side of a transaction from the corpora
tion) that would deny the directors the presumption of the business
judgment defense. Prior cases56 required the “plaintiff [to] . . . show
. . . that impermissible motives predominated in the making of the
decision in question.”57 Yet because of what the Unocal court
termed the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting prima
rily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation” in
taking such actions, it prescribed an enhanced duty that required
additional judicial review (of the threat and the proportionality of
the defense) before the business judgment presumption was ap
plied.58 For similar reasons (and a decade before Unocal) the Mas
sachusetts courts conclude that existing law would lead to
invocation of the business judgment rule too quickly and therefore
impose their own enhanced review.
That breakthrough was informed by the court’s clear under
standing of the plight of the minority investor as previously dis
53. Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986, 1014-15
(1957) (“Actually the so-called fiduciary rule of the insiders is invoked by the courts
when selfishly motivated conduct exceeds certain bounds of fairness, as when the cor
poration is overcharged for property or services, or minority stockholders are frozen
out of the enterprise . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
54. Symposium, Close Corporation, 52 NW. U.L. REV. 345, 396 (1957).
55. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
56. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 292.
58. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951.
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cussed. First, the court acknowledged majority control that is the
reality of the corporate form and the unlikelihood of being able to
challenge such conduct under the fiduciary limits just described.59
Second, the court recognized the intimacy and illiquidity of the mi
nority’s investment and the vulnerability that resulted from that.60
The combination is what the court called a trap, and what has been
referred to here as the predicament of a minority owner.61
The facts of Donahue are not the most severe example of the
plight just described, viewed within the context set out in the
59. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975).
[T]he power of the board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare or
withhold dividends and to deny the minority employment is easily converted
to a device to disadvantage minority stockholders.
The minority can, of course, initiate suit against the majority and their
directors. Self-serving conduct by directors is proscribed by the director’s fi
duciary obligation to the corporation. However, in practice, the plaintiff will
find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies. Such policies
are considered to be within the judgment of the directors.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 514-15.
Thus, when these types of “freeze-outs” are attempted by the majority
stockholders, the minority stockholders, cut off from all corporation-related
revenues, must either suffer their losses or seek a buyer for their shares. Many
minority stockholders will be unwilling or unable to wait for an alteration in
majority policy. Typically, the minority stockholder in a close corporation has
a substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation.
The stockholder may have anticipated that his salary from his position with
the corporation would be his livelihood. Thus, he cannot afford to wait pas
sively. He must liquidate his investment in the close corporation in order to
reinvest the funds in income-producing enterprises.
At this point, the true plight of the minority stockholder in a close corpo
ration becomes manifest. He cannot easily reclaim his capital. In a large pub
lic corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could sell his
stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this
market is not available for shares in the close corporation . . . .
The minority stockholder, by definition lacking fifty per cent of the corpo
rate shares, can never “authorize” the corporation to file a petition for dissolu
tion under G.L. c. 156B, § 99(a), by his own vote. He will seldom have at his
disposal the requisite favorable provision in the articles of organization.
Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 515.
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may be trapped in
a disadvantageous situation. No outsider would knowingly assume the posi
tion of the disadvantaged minority. The outsider would have the same diffi
culties. To cut losses, the minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with
the majority. This is the capstone of the majority plan. Majority “freeze-out”
schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to re
linquish stock at inadequate prices. When the minority stockholder agrees to
sell out at less than fair value, the majority has won.
Id. (citations omitted).
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O’Neal treatises, but it does show a minority shareholder left with
no liquidity at a time that the majority shareholder used company
funds to provide such liquidity for himself.62 The president (Rodd)
and the plant superintendent (Donahue) had in effect purchased
the company where they had each been working for the prior two
decades.63 Rodd was clearly the more central of the two. He
owned 80% of the company’s 200 shares and was the dominant
force at the company, even mortgaging his house to provide for
cash for company expenditures. The two continued to lead the
company for the next nine years when they each gave way to two
sons of Rodd who became respectively president and plant superin
tendent. The problem that was litigated arose five years later when
Rodd retired from the board and as treasurer and company funds
were used to repurchase the remaining forty-five of his shares that
he had not previously given to his children. There is no indication
that Donahue had been fired or anything other than normal retire
ment, but nevertheless he and his wife had no liquidity for their
stock. After the corporation’s use of corporate funds to pay Rodd,
Donahue and his wife sought the same $800 per share price for
their twenty shares (in contrast to the price they had been offered
during the previous four years from $40 to $200 per share).64
The facts in Wilkes possessed more of the characteristics of the
plight described by O’Neal and by the court in Donahue.65 There,
four acquaintances acquired land and established a nursing home,
an enterprise that quickly proved profitable for all participants. Af
ter thirteen years, the plaintiff, Wilkes, challenged the sale of a por
tion of the corporation’s property to Quinn, another of the original
four investors and the informal managing director. As a result,
Quinn ended up paying more for the property, the relationship be
tween Quinn and Wilkes began to deteriorate, Wilkes’s salary was
eliminated, and the others declined to reelect him as a director.
Again the court, (four of the five members having also joined the
Donahue decision) defined the issue in terms of the position of a
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation.66 The Court
62. Id. at 508-11.
63. Id. at 509-11. The remainder of the facts in this paragraph are taken from the
court’s description on pages 509-11.
64. Id. at 511.
65. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-63 (Mass.
1976). The remainder of the facts in this paragraph are taken from the court’s descrip
tion on pages 659-63.
66. Id. at 662-63.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE205.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 15

27-SEP-11

ALLOCATING THE ROLES

9:12

383

recognized the illiquidity of the minority’s investment and the vari
ous ways that control can be misused beyond the equal opportunity
context in Donahue, each of which would be met by the same re
frain of judicial deference to the legitimate sphere of the controlling
directors.67 As in Donahue, the court noted the intimacy and multi
faceted nature of the participants’ relation to the enterprise and
tied it to the investors’ expectations in entering into the venture.68
The instrument used by the court in both cases to provide relief
for minority shareholders frozen out of a closely held corporation
was an enhanced fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty,
expanded in Wilkes to include consideration of the majority’s right
67.

Id. at 662.

In the Donahue case we recognized that one peculiar aspect of close cor
porations was the opportunity afforded to majority stockholders to oppress,
disadvantage or “freeze out” minority stockholders. In Donahue itself, for
example, the majority refused the minority an equal opportunity to sell a rata
ble number of shares to the corporation at the same price available to the
majority. The net result of this refusal, we said, was that the minority could be
forced to “sell out at less than fair value,” since there is by definition no ready
market for minority stock in a close corporation.
“Freeze outs,” however, may be accomplished by the use of other devices.
One such device which has proved to be particularly effective in accomplishing
the purpose of the majority is to deprive minority stockholders of corporate
offices and of employment with the corporation. This “freeze out” technique
has been successful because courts fairly consistently have been disinclined to
interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the selection
and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees, which essen
tially involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority con
trol. As one authoritative source has said, “[M]any courts apparently feel that
there is a legitimate sphere in which the controlling [directors or] shareholders
can act in their own interest even if the minority suffers.”
Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 662-663.
The denial of employment to the minority at the hands of the majority is
especially pernicious in some instances. A guaranty of employment with the
corporation may have been one of the “basic reason[s] why a minority owner
has invested capital in the firm.” The minority stockholder typically depends
on his salary as the principal return on his investment, since the “earnings of a
close corporation . . . are distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and
retirement benefits.” Other noneconomic interests of the minority stock
holder are likewise injuriously affected by barring him from corporate office.
Such action severely restricts his participation in the management of the enter
prise, and he is relegated to enjoying those benefits incident to his status as a
stockholder. In sum, by terminating a minority stockholder’s employment or
by severing him from a position as an officer or director, the majority effec
tively frustrates the minority stockholder’s purposes in entering into the cor
porate venture and also deny him an equal return on his investment.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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of selfish ownership.69 As a result, Wilkes received the salary he
would have received had he remained an officer and director.70
There is a remarkable similarity in the approach of the Massa
chusetts courts in these two cases and that of the New York Court
of Appeals—a few years later—in holding that judicial relief was
appropriate to a minority investor under that state’s involuntary
dissolution statute. The New York high court anchored its interpre
tation of the statute on the characteristics of the close corpora
tion.71 Moreover, the court properly understood the intimate and
multifaceted relationship that often characterizes the participants’
relationship in the closely held enterprise.72 And as with the prior
cases and previous academic writing, we see the recognition of the
impact of statutory norms in creating the risk of oppression.73
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 663.
Id. at 665.
In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Gardstein, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984).
The statutory concept of “oppressive actions” can, perhaps, best be un
derstood by examining the characteristics of close corporations and the Legis
lature’s general purpose in creating this involuntary-dissolution statute. It is
widely understood that, in addition to supplying capital to a contemplated or
ongoing enterprise and expecting a fair and equal return, parties comprising
the ownership of a close corporation may expect to be actively involved in its
management and operation.
Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id.
As a leading commentator in the field has observed: “Unlike the typical
shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who may be simply an investor or a
speculator and cares nothing for the responsibilities of management, the
shareholder in a close corporation is a co-owner of the business and wants the
privileges and powers that go with ownership. His participation in that partic
ular corporation is often his principal or sole source of income. As a matter of
fact, providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason
why he participated in organizing the corporation. He may or may not antici
pate an ultimate profit from the sale of his interest, but he normally draws
very little from the corporation as dividends. In his capacity as an officer or
employee of the corporation, he looks to his salary for the principal return on
his capital investment, because earnings of a close corporation, as is well
known, are distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement
benefits.”
Id. (quoting CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972), supra note 35,
at 21-22).
73. Id. at 1178-79.
Shareholders enjoy flexibility in memorializing these expectations
through agreements setting forth each party’s rights and obligations in corpo
rate governance. In the absence of such an agreement, however, ultimate decision-making power respecting corporate policy will be reposed in the holders
of a majority interest in the corporation (see, e.g., Business Corporation Law,
§§ 614, 708). A wielding of this power by any group controlling a corporation
may serve to destroy a stockholder’s vital interests and expectations.

R
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Again, the court notes the impact of illiquidity in contrast to an
investment in a public corporation;74 and as an addition to the prior
analysis, the New York court adopted what at the time had been a
relatively recent move to using reasonable expectations to measure
whether there was sufficient cause for judicial intervention.75
After Donahue and Wilkes, and particularly in the decade fol
lowing Kemp & Beatley, the pace of legislative and judicial protec
tion for minority shareholders increased dramatically. The focus on
contracting that had dominated the 1950s and 1960s gave way to
judicial action. Among the fifty states, there were parallel develop
ments providing for judicial action via fiduciary duty and by means
of a court granting relief under an equity-sounding oppression stat
ute.76 The result is that there have been five distinct movements of
the law toward providing broader relief for minority investors in a
close corporation. The enhanced fiduciary duty of Wilkes and Don
ahue may be the least used, depending upon how you count, but the
larger point is that in most states the five doctrines are complimen
tary and each reflects the same source—the close corporation preId. (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 1179.
As the stock of closely held corporations generally is not readily salable, a
minority shareholder at odds with management policies may be without either
a voice in protecting his or her interests or any reasonable means of withdraw
ing his or her investment. This predicament may fairly be considered the legis
lative concern underlying the provision at issue in this case; inclusion of the
criteria that the corporation’s stock not be traded on securities markets and
that the complaining shareholder be subject to oppressive actions supports this
conclusion.
Id.
75. Id.
Defining oppressive conduct as distinct from illegality in the present con
text has been considered in other forums. The question has been resolved by
considering oppressive actions to refer to conduct that substantially defeats
the “reasonable expectations” held by minority shareholders in committing
their capital to the particular enterprise. This concept is consistent with the
apparent purpose underlying the provision under review. A shareholder who
reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or
her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management,
or some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when
others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no
effective means of salvaging the investment.
Given the nature of close corporations and the remedial purpose of the
statute, this court holds that utilizing a complaining shareholder’s “reasonable
expectations” as a means of identifying and measuring conduct alleged to be
oppressive is appropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
76. Thompson, supra note 8, at 704.
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dicament recognized in Wilkes and Donahue. The five
developments include:
(1) Authorizing a court to cabin entity permanence in contexts
where there has been a showing of oppressive or similar behavior
by the majority. All but eleven states now provide such a way
around corporate permanence if there has been oppression or con
duct by the majority that is unfairly prejudicial to the minority.77
Courts in several states echo the New York court’s finding that
these statutes were designed by the legislature to provide additional
remedies for minority shareholders beyond those previously pro
vided.78 And unlike the period prior to Donahue, these statutes
have been widely used to provide relief to minority shareholders.
Even in the states that do not have an oppression statute, there is
little evidence of opposition to providing a judicial way out of per
manence.79 Delaware and a few other states are outliers as to this
trend, but Delaware ought to be considered a special case, given
that any special rules for close corporations have the potential to
create uncertainty among public corporations that provide a signifi
cant share of the Delaware state revenues.80
(2) In half of the states, courts or legislatures have, like New
York, used “reasonable expectations” to define oppression, a con
cept that looks to the context as described in Donahue, Wilkes, and
Kemp & Beatley. In some states this standard or something similar
77. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 7.11 (Rev. 2d ed.
2009) [hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
AND LLC MEMBER].
78. See McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 155 (Utah 2009) (“[T]he legislature
intended to protect shareholders from oppression and misconduct by those in control.
To construe the Act’s provisions to require the same fiduciary duty for publicly held
and closely held shareholders would not adequately protect close corporation share
holders.”); Fulton v. Callahan, 621 So. 2d 1235, 1252 (Ala. 1993) (noting that inclusion
of oppression reflected “the legislative extension of the remedy to do more than just
protect or rescue the underlying assets of the corporation from willfully destructive
conduct of controlling shareholders”).
79. See, e.g., G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 243 (Ind. 2001)
(noting that oppression was intentionally deleted from the code because of concern that
it might be abused in a hostile takeover, a reason not relevant in the context of a close
corporation); Jerry Cohen & Jonathan C. Guest, The New Massachusetts Business Cor
poration Act, Chapter 127 Acts of 2003, 88 MASS. L. REV. 213, 213 (2004) (noting that to
facilitate legislative adoption of the new business corporation act required non-distur
bance of Donahue and its progeny and the state’s anti-takeover statutes).
80. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 365, 395 (1992).
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is specified in the statute.81 In most of the states, adoption has fol
lowed a pattern set forth in Kemp & Beatley where the court recog
nizes a decision normally within the authority of directors and the
majority under corporate law will, in a close corporation, often frus
trate the expectation of investors in entering into the enterprise.82
Although there were oppression statutes in many states at the time
of Donahue, the continuing spread of these statutes after Donahue
and the willingness to incorporate reasonable expectations as the
touchstone has made the statute an effective remedy for
oppression.83
(3) Also important to the effective development of the oppres
sion remedy was the development of a consensus that a buyout was
the appropriate remedy when oppression had been shown. Again
this was a combined result of legislative changes and judicial inter
pretations reflecting the legislative purpose in providing a judicial
remedy that Kemp & Beatley recognized. In some states, a buyout
is authorized by statute.84 In other states, courts have used their
general remedial power to order a buyout.85 But the result is that
there is specific authority for buyouts in half of the states.86 The
move to buyouts can be seen in comparing two empirical studies on
either side of Wilkes. In a study of the 1960-1976 period, Professors
Hetherington and Dooley, surveying fifty-four involuntary dissolu
tion cases in the sixteen years that mostly preceded Wilkes, found
no relief in half of the cases, involuntary dissolution in sixteen,

81. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1
115 (2009).
82. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND
LLC MEMBER, supra note 77, § 7:13.
83. See supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-43 for a discussion of the spread of oppression statutes. New York itself did not have an oppression
statute at the time of Donahue and Wilkes, see 1979 N.Y. Laws, c. 217, § 1 (adding
§ 1104-a) so that the New York statute and the broad interpretation of the statute in
Kemp & Beatley illustrates this trend.
84. Often this buyout is at the option of the majority shareholder after a minority
has petitioned for dissolution. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 2003);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 14.34 (4th ed. 2008). In other states, statutes list
buyout among various possible remedies. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West
2003).
85. See e.g., Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983). See generally
O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEM
BER, supra note 77, § 7:19.
86. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note
31, § 9:18.
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buyouts in three, and other relief in four.87 When Professor Hayn
sworth performed a similar study in the 1984-1985 period, there had
been a significant increase in the number of cases and a dramatic
shift with buyouts in twenty cases (of the thirty-seven cases), invol
untary dissolution in ten, and no relief only in four.88
(4) Minority shareholders seeking to enforce fiduciary duties
are usually permitted to bring a direct individual action as opposed
to derivative claim in the name of, and on behalf of, the corpora
tion.89 The result is to expand the possibility of relief and again to
focus courts on the relationship within the close corporation. Courts
permit direct relief where the only interested parties are two indi
viduals or sets of shareholders—one who is in control and the other
who is not; other courts analogize a small corporation, to a partner
ship where direct claims are permitted; still others observe that a
derivative claim is unnecessary where only the complaining share
holder is disadvantaged by the actions taken by the majority.90 The
American Law Institute’s adoption of a direct cause of action in a
closely held corporation has spurred judicial movement in this
direction.91
(5) Since Donahue and Wilkes, courts have continued to hold
that majority shareholders in a close corporation have an enhanced
fiduciary duty so as to provide relief to minority shareholders in a
close corporation after a falling out among the parties.92 There
have been contrary holdings by some courts refusing to apply an
equal opportunity right in particular contexts.93 Delaware has put
it in broader terms of preferring contractual solutions to judicial
ones: “Tools of good corporate [governance] are designed to give a
87. John A.C. Hetherington & Michael Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1, 63-75 (1977).
88. Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 50-53 (1987).
89. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND
LLC MEMBER, supra note 77, § 7:08 (collecting direct causes of action in an oppression
setting).
90. See id. § 7:07 (describing different reasons courts have given for permitting
direct individual causes of action).
91. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA
TIONS § 7.01(d) (1994).
92. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note
31, § 9:18 (providing chart for cases in individual states).
93. Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 654 (Md. Ct. App. 1985);
Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Dela
houssaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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purchasing minority stockholder [an] opportunity to bargain for
protection before parting with consideration. It would do violence
to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion” a
judicial remedy for which the parties had not contracted.94 But as a
Utah court recently put it, “the Delaware approach . . . stands in
sharp contrast to the fiduciary duty standard followed by the major
ity of states.”95 A number of states follow Massachusetts in analo
gizing to the fiduciary duties of partners.96
The statutory oppression remedy and the common law en
hanced fiduciary duty action are complimentary and sometimes ef
fectively substitutes.97 A Massachusetts court held, for example,
“[t]he standards used to determine a breach of fiduciary duty are
often the same used to define oppression.”98 Many courts have de
fined oppression by reference to reasonable expectations or fiduci
ary duty.99 Given this development, it makes little sense to
consider enhanced fiduciary duty by itself rather than part of an
shareholder’s cause of action for oppression in which the statutory
standard in the more common illustration. Practically, the en
hanced fiduciary duty doctrine fills a gap in the coverage of oppres
sion in that three of the eleven states that do not have an
oppression statute—Massachusetts,100 Ohio,101 and Indiana102—use
an enhanced fiduciary duty to provide relief to a minority share
holder facing the closely held corporation predicament as the over
lap in the excerpts from Donahue and Kemp & Beatley illustrate.103
94. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).
95. McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 155 (Utah 2009).
96. See River Mgmt. Corp. v. Lodge Props., Inc., 829 P.2d 398, 401 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E. 2d 712, 716 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); Fought v.
Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 170-71 (Miss. 1989); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992); A. Teixeira & Co., Inc. v. Teixeira, 699 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (R.I. 1997).
97. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 700.
98. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 n.3 (Mass. 2006).
99. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that oppressive conduct of those in control is closely related to breach of
fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders). See generally O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 31, § 9:27.
100. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
101. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) (noting that the majority
used its controlling position for personal enrichment depriving the plaintiff of the bene
fit of his investment and the opportunity to share in corporate profits).
102. G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E. 2d 227, 243 (Ind. 2001) (permitting
court to order buyout for breach of fiduciary duty); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor
Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E. 2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1998) (“Courts have traditionally interpreted
fiduciary dut[y] differently for closely-held corporations as opposed to publicly held
corporations for which most of . . . statutory norms were established.”).
103. See supra notes 59-83 and accompanying text.
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As a result, only Delaware, Florida, and a half dozen of our smaller
states lack either statutory or judicial authority for providing a judi
cial means to prevent the corporate attributes of centralized con
trol/majority rule and entity permanence from being used to
frustrate the reasonable expectations of participants in a closely
held business.104
The overall result is that a remarkable consensus has devel
oped in the years since Donahue and Wilkes that the predicament
or plight of minority investors in a closely held business warrants
the possibility (but not the requirement) of judicial review to pro
vide liquidity where the minority investor is receiving no money in
contradiction of the parties’ expectations in the venture.105 This
consensus has arisen in spite of a decades-long reform tradition ex
panding the room for contracting in the closely held firm. Harry
Henn, writer of a widely-used corporations’ treatise of the period,
noted that “drafting . . . enabled close corporations to achieve most
of their legitimate object[ives] thereby rendering the present situa
tion tolerable.”106 Changes made to the Model Act in the early
1990s were in some ways the culmination of the contracting evolu
tion within close corporations. The annotation to section 7.32 notes
that the provision legitimizes all of the agreements that planners of
a close corporation would want.107 But the five developments out
lined above have continued. Henn’s conclusion that the situation
was tolerable has turned out not to be widely accepted given the
close corporation predicament. Even the sophisticated contracting
envisioned by section 7.32 of the Model Act has not removed the
need for a judicially-provided route around permanence for those
who have made an investment in the closely held firm when there
later occurs a falling out among participants and corporate govern
ance permits one set of participants to make decisions for what had
been a shared enterprise.
104. And that list is narrowed further by various holdings even in those states.
See, e.g., Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *8 (Del. Ct. Ch. Feb. 11, 1992)
(using reasonable expectations to determine breach of fiduciary duty); Donofrio v.
Matassini, 503 So. 2d 1278, 1281-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Richards v. Bryan, 879
P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Beard v. Love, 173 P.3d 796, 804-05 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2007) (allowing for dissolution in a case involving oppression).
105. See Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 383 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (ordering
buy-out of interest owned by minority shareholder at fair market value); Duncan v.
Lichtenberger, 671 S.W.2d 948, 953-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming jury verdict
awarding damages to two minority shareholders who were not receiving compensation).
106. HARRY HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 512 (2d ed. 1970).
107. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 7.32(a) (4th ed. 2008).
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IN THE

Longevity for a judicial opinion in terms of its impact on the
law turns not just on how it turned heads at the time it was handed
down, but also on its application to new situations so that successive
generations of judges and lawyers believe the principles of the case
remain useful in addressing evolving contexts that arise. The LLC
provides an opportunity to make such an evaluation as to the last
ing impact of Donahue and Wilkes. This Part considers the begin
nings of LLCs in the late 1970s and their rapid growth which
occurred in the early 1990s. Part B then asks if investors in LLCs
face the same or similar predicament as those in close corporations.
Part C returns to the legal responses to the predicament of the mi
nority investor in a closely held firm considered in Part I and asks
how they would apply in the LLC context. Part D then looks at
data on where LLCs organize to suggest Delaware is appealing to a
specific segment of the LLC market where contracting may be
more efficient and more likely to be used.
A. The Origins of LLCs
The early history of LLCs in America is a now familiar story
(and entirely postdates Donahue and Wilkes). The Wyoming and
then Florida legislatures passed the initial statutes, but there really
could not be any significant use of the form until the IRS blessed
LLCs as providing pass-through taxation.108 The initial IRS ap
proval turned on the Kintner factors requiring an entity seeking
non-corporate tax status to have a majority of non-corporate attrib
utes, using attributes similar to the ones discussed at the beginning
of this article.109 Given the requirements of Kintner, investors de
siring the corporate factor of limited liability, needed to avoid the
other named corporate factors of centralized control, continuity of
108.

See generally LARRY RIBSTEIN & ROBERT KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEAT
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (3d ed. 2004).
109. The factors take their name from a 1954 appellate opinion, United States v.
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). The case involved a context in which the private
planners sought to be a corporation given the historical tax advantages discussed above.
To do so, the court in Kitner said an enterprise must have at least three of the four
named corporate characteristics Id. at 422-24. As the changes in the tax law moved
toward leading parties more often to seek non-corporate or pass-through tax treatment,
the same approach continued to be used, even though the parties essentially had
swapped positions. See generally Thompson, supra note 8, at 931.
INGE ON
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life, and free transferability of interest.110 As a result, early LLC
statutes provided these non-corporate features, even put in a bullet
proof format in various states. Then, in the mid-1990s, the IRS
changed positions, withdrew from refereeing which non-corporate
entities could get pass-through tax status and which could not, and
left it to the choice of the planners through a “check the box” provi
sion.111 Thereafter, most states changed their LLC statutes to pro
vide more in the way of centralized control and certainly more in
the way of entity permanence since those changes would no longer
endanger the entity’s pass-through tax status.112 LLCs are now the
most-used legal form for the closely held business.113
There are multiple possible explanations for this story. Profes
sor Larry Ribstein, who rightfully deserves a central place in ex
plaining LLCs, describes the move in his contribution to this
Symposium as “freeing small firms to adopt standard forms that
suited their needs.”114 I think it is more likely that LLCs grew ini
tially because a small subset of investors were not able to gain their
preferred answers to the three questions that are bundled when one
chooses a particular legal form of business. The three basic ques
tions for which participants seek answers in choosing the legal form
within which to organize, previously discussed in Part I, are: (1) a
favorable legal rule in their relationship toward outsiders who deal
with the business (limited liability); (2) a favorable legal rule in
their relationship with government (lower taxes); and (3) satisfac
tory rules in the relationships with co-venturers. Since the three
questions are bundled within the choice of business form decision
there is the possibility of having to trade off disadvantages or uncer
tainty in one area to gain more beneficial advantages or certainty in
110. An entity could not have more than two corporate characteristics and still
get non-corporate tax treatment. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to 3T (1994) (repealed
1996).
111. See Treas. Reg. § 301.770-1 (effective Jan. 1, 1997).
112. O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 31,
ch. 5.
113. Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New Kings of the Hill: An Empirical
Study of the Number of LLCs, Corporations, and LLPs Formed in the United States
Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM.
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459-60 (2010) (reporting LLCs outpace corporations in most
states; overall by a 2-1 margin).
114. Larry Ribstein, Escaping the Nursing Home: Contracts in LLCs and Close
Corporations, W. NEW ENG. L. & BUS. CTR., Annual Conference 2010: Fiduciary Duties
in Closely Held Firms 35 Years after Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., http://
web7.streamhoster.com/wnecvideo/law/law_and_business//panel4_2010.html (last vis
ited Apr. 7, 2011).
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other areas. As noted in the previous part, my view is that if there
is any conflict among the three areas, the first two questions almost
always dominate the third in the choice of business firms. Limited
liability and lower taxes usually are seen as providing a real and
immediate benefit. Governance rules of centralized control and
permanence may not be the best fit for a closely held business, but
possible disadvantages are likely to be seen as uncertain and dis
tant. Participants do not think (or do not want to contemplate) that
their relationship will falter, and if it they do think about it, they
assume, perhaps naively, that they can deal with it.
At the time that LLCs were created there were some investors
who could not achieve the favorable bundle of limited liability,
pass-through-tax treatment, and satisfactory governance.115 For ex
ample, in the 1980s, income tax changes removed what had been
the benefit of having corporate level tax.116 While subchapter S
permitted most small corporations to choose to have pass-through
tax treatment, there were a few tax breaks in real estate or oil and
gas that could only be achieved outside of subchapter S.117 Since
limited liability was essentially only available in the corporate form,
these firms could not get both limited liability and the lowest tax
treatment within the same business structure. Perhaps more impor
tant to the spreading adoption of LLCs was a second group that
could not get the favorable combination. Professional firms, such
as accountants, traditionally had been restricted in their ability to
incorporate and thereby gain limited liability.118 The professional
incorporation statutes that had been passed by many states in the
mid-twentieth century did not permit the same degree of liability
115. See Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests
Should Not Be Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this Result, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1282 (1994); Park McGinty, The Limited Liability Company: Op
portunity for Selective Securities Law Deregulation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 369, 425 (1996).
116. Until 1982, the highest individual tax rate always exceeded the highest cor
porate tax rate. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 299-305 (5th ed.
1987). For example, in 1942, the highest individual rate was 88% while the rate in the
top corporate bracket was 40%, id. at 313, 321, creating an incentive to use the corpo
rate form if a double tax could be avoided when the corporate earnings were distributed
to participants and if other tax provisions (for example, basis rules, deductions, exemp
tions) did not eliminate the advantage from the rate differential. Tax reform in 1986
ended the General Utilities doctrine, which was a principal method of avoiding a
double tax for businesses using the corporate form. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2269, 2269-75 (1986) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §
337 (2006)).
117. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note
31, at § 2:9.
118. Id.
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shielding as in a traditional corporation.119 LLC statutes offered a
way to achieve a more accommodating limited liability rule in the
professions.
B. Do Investors in LLCs Share the Predicament Identified in
Donahue/Wilkes?
Do minority investors in LLCs find themselves in the same
predicament or trap that motivated the Massachusetts court to act
in Donahue and Wilkes? As a first cut, the LLC shares with the
traditional close corporation the characteristics of intimacy and illi
quidity that are at the heart of the oppression analysis. LLCs are
usually relationships among a very small set of participants, often
linked by family or close personal ties.120 As with close corpora
tions, the participants often play multiple roles in the enterprise.
They provide the necessary capital and the management; they look
to the enterprise not just for a return on their investment, but also
for a job. It is a greater part of their life than the publicly-held
enterprise is to the participants in that entity. Being cut-off from
the LLC will disrupt a relationship that is more intimate and in
tense than in a publicly-held company.
Like investors in close corporations, investors in a LLC have
no market for their interests. This illiquidity means that if, because
of a death, disability, or change of position in life, they need to get
cash for their investment, they cannot look to the market for liquid
ity as can investors in a public corporation. And, if they are forced
out by the other participants, they may be left with little or no re
turn on what they have put into the business.
In the initial LLCs (those formed under a statute that existed
prior to “check the box”), this risk was considerably less than for
investors in a minority position in a close corporation.121 In order
to gain the favorable pass-through tax treatment LLCs had to pro
vide for easy-exit, shared governance, and not provide entity per
manence.122 These mandatory rules reduced the likelihood of the
119. Id.
120. But not always—it is possible to be a publicly held LLC even if there may be
corporate-type taxation. See generally Kahn v. Portnoy, No. 3515-CC2, 2008 WL
5197164 (Del Ch. Dec. 11, 2008).
121. Check the box refers to the IRS choice to permit unincorporated entities to
choose whether they want to be taxed as individuals or corporations. See Simplification
of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 301).
122. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 418 (9th Cir. 1954). See generally
Thompson, supra note 8, at 931.
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Donahue/Wilkes predicament. After “check the box,” state legisla
tures launched a widespread reformulation of their LLC statutes.123
It became common to provide for manager-managed LLCs as well
as a member-managed format.124 Some statutes even provided for
officers and directors so that even the labels would mimic the cor
poration.125 Even more relevant for this discussion, almost all the
states changed their rules about easy exit to remove a participant’s
ability to end the relationship on terms that would provide anything
more than being able to assign the income stream.126 This move
back toward permanence was itself driven by tax concerns; not the
income tax concerns that had driven the early LLC movement, but
the estate tax worries.127 It turns out that the best way to keep
valuation down for estate tax is to be able to point to restrictions on
getting out, which will reduce the value.128 Again, the possibility of
getting a definite tax advantage in the foreseeable future trumps the
less accessible possibility of being disadvantaged if there were to be
a falling out among the participants.
Going back to the menu of possible responses to this predica
ment or trap, the preferred solution for many in the LLC discussion
is private contracting. Turning again to Professor Ribstein’s contri
bution to this Symposium, note the optimism permeating the LLC
form as opposed to the close corporation of an earlier day: “Wilkes
123. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 932
33 (2005) (“[F]ollowing the passage of the ‘check-the-box’ regulations, there was no
longer a tax-driven need for state statutes to deny the LLC certain corporate character
istics. In response, many state legislatures eliminated or restricted the withdrawal and
dissolution rights that had served to combat a continuity of life finding.”).
124. REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 407 (2006), availa
ble at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.pdf; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005).
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West 2004) (manager-managed as
the default governance in LLC).
126. Note the changes in Delaware law made in 1996. Prior to 1996, its LLC
statute provided that, unless otherwise provided, a member had the right to resign upon
giving six months notice and then the right to receive, within a reasonable time, the fair
value of the member’s ownership interest. 1992 Delaware Laws Ch. 434 (H.B. 608).
Effective in 1996, the default rule flipped and now provides that a member can resign
only as set out in the operating agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-603 (2005). The
change thus flips which party needs to worry more about working out an agreement.
A departing party who before had protection even if the agreement was silent now is
locked-in unless alternative provisions are put into the agreement.
127. 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2006).
128. 26 U.S.C. § 2703; Treasury Reg. § 20.2031-1 & 2 (as amended in 1965). See
generally O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 31,
§ 7:49.
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and similar close corporation cases are the product of an earlier
time when closely held firms lacked sophistication and coherent
contracting technology and therefore needed significant judicial as
sistance to fill the significant gaps in their contracts.”129 The sug
gestion is that the trap is a relic of the past that investors are now
able to use “sophisticated and coherent contracting technology.”130
This approach recognizes that parties “need” to address allowing
members to exit via buyout or dissolution, and even more, assumes
they will do so successfully.
Think again about the world before Donahue/Wilkes and con
template the belief in contracts that motivated those early pio
neers—vetoes, agreements to arbitrate and the rest (with little
reliance on fiduciary duty).131 Although courts in LLC cases regu
larly refer to the purpose of the statute as to give maximum effect
of freedom of contract,132 maximizing contracting is also a principal
purpose of corporations statues in general and provisions relevant
to close corporations in particular. For decades, corporations stat
utes have been referred to as enabling statutes, which, of course,
means deferring to the parties’ contracts.133 For close corporations
in particular, section 7.32 of the Model Business Corporation Act is
intended to cover all the key contracts that a planner would want to
use in close corporations.134 There are some differences with LLCs,
principally in the ability of the parties to contract around fiduciary
duty or involuntary dissolution statutes, but the difference is not as
great as the language of some courts and commentators might lead
you to believe.
Consider also the continuing bounded rationality problems of
investors in the closely held firm and the extent to which more im
mediate tax motivations still dominate decision-making.135 The
choice is not unlike what faced the Massachusetts courts at the time
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Ribstein, supra note 114.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999).
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991) (“The corporate code in almost every state is
an ‘enabling’ statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their
own tickets, to establish systems of governance without scrutiny from a regulator.”).
134. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2005) (see official comment) (“Section
7.32(a) validates virtually all types of shareholder agreements that, in practice, normally
concern shareholders or their advisors.”).
135. The sticky defaults discussed in Deborah DeMott’s contribution to this Sym
posium is an example. Deborah A. Demott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employ
ment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497 (2011).
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of Donahue and Wilkes—is there a benefit to having a vehicle for
judges to provide liquidity when there has been a falling out among
the parties and the rules chosen for tax reasons have an unexpected
result of permitting those in the majority to continue using the mi
nority’s money for an indefinite period?
C. Involuntary Dissolution Statutes for LLCs
As they have been in close corporations, involuntary dissolu
tion statutes have been the dominant means for working out the
extent to which there should be a role for courts in providing liquid
ity when there has been a falling out among the parties and one
party is left locked into, or squeezed out of, the entity. LLC invol
untary dissolution statutes primarily come in two flavors. Almost
all states permit a court, in its discretion, to order dissolution when
it is “not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in con
formity with the articles of organization or operating agree
ment.”136 That language itself has been used to order dissolution in
many cases where the parties cannot get along, such as in a twoperson entity where there is evidence of a breakdown in the rela
tionship between the parties.137 The cases include patterns that will
be familiar to readers of close corporations cases—where one mem
ber locked the other out,138 where there was a history of bad blood
between the parties,139 where there was no communication between
the parties,140 and where the parties had combined not speaking
136. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 44 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109, § 45.
Only a handful of states do not include such a provision. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.400, 405 (2010) (impossible for the company to carry on the purposes of the
company). The other states omitting “not reasonably practicable” do provide for disso
lution upon deadlock. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 117 (West 2010); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.833 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:51 (West 2005); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-6-02 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119 (2005).
137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
138. Connors v. Howe Elegant, LLC, No. 4003783, 2009 WL 242324, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Jan. 8, 2009) (holding it to be no longer reasonably practicable to carry on busi
ness when one of the two 50/50 partners shut the other partner out of the business and
transferred all funds out of the LLC account).
139. Lindsay v. Pacific Topsoils, Inc., No. 50558-1-1, 2003 WL 22121055, at *18
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2003) (holding that substantial “history . . . of bad blood”
shown in the lower court was enough to show that it was no longer reasonably practica
ble to carry on business).
140. Polak v. Kobayashi, No. 05-330-SLF, 2008 WL 4905519, at *5 (D. Del. Nov.
13, 2008) (ordering judicial dissolution where two 50/50 partners no longer communi
cated and each were acting to the detriment of the other).
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with multiple lawsuits.141 Similar reasoning has been extended to a
three person entity divided equally between two sides.142 Where
one of the two 50% owners made unilateral arrangements to the
detriment of the LLC and the other owner leading to a cessation of
a business or personal relationship, and the sole asset no longer ex
isted, the court ordered dissolution under a “not reasonably practi
cable” standard.143
Note that these are cases where there were gaps in the operat
ing agreement despite the sophisticated and the coherent con
tracting technology available to them.144 Courts do refer to the
operating agreement in deciding whether judicial intervention is ap
propriate. Thus, a court defined the statutory standard by reference
to the purpose clause of the agreement.145 Judicial relief has been
ordered under the “not reasonably practicable” standard due to
where the operating agreement left the parties.146 A Louisiana
court pointed to provisions that permitted one member to fire an
other, but then permitted the other members to rehire the fired
member, and another provision by which any member could assign
a portion of an interest to a spouse and thereby become immune
from expulsion by unanimous vote.147
About one third of the states use statutory language that tracks
the close corporation approach to involuntary dissolution based on
oppressive acts toward the minority or similar language.148 Thus,
eleven states use oppressive acts as the trigger (either alone or in
141. Weinmann v. Duhon, 818 So. 2d 206, 209 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing dis
solution where there were two members representing forty percent of the company who
had differing ideas of how the LLC should be run and where there was no alternative
method for dissolution in the operating agreement).
142. In re Silver Leaf, LLC, No. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641, at *1, *12 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 18, 2005) (ordering dissolution but refusing to name participant as receiver; court
said evidence indicated that business was simply a penny stock fraud).
143. Saunders v. Firtel, 978 A.2d 487, 499 (Conn. 2009) (affirmed dissolution of
the LLC where one of the two 50/50 members acted to the detriment of the LLC and to
the other member).
144. See, e.g., Weinmann, 818 So.2d at 209; Saunders, 978 A.2d at 499; Connors v.
Howe Elegant, LLC, No. 4003783, 2009 WL 242324, at *1 (Conn. Super. Jan. 8, 2009).
145. In re Seneca Investments, LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (failure to
make distributions along with other operating agreement violations was not enough for
judicial dissolution).
146. In re Silver Leaf, 2005 WL 2045641, at *11 (noting that “[g]iven [the LLC’s]
ownership structure and Operating Agreement, Silver Leaf is no longer able to carry on
its business in a reasonably practicable manner”).
147. Weinmann, 818 So. 2d at 210 (judicial dissolution is appropriate where both
50/50 owners express their wishes to no longer continue business with one another).
148. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-801 (LexisNexis 2008) (oppressive,
unfairly prejudicial conduct, not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s busi
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combination with “unfairly prejudicial” or “not reasonably practi
cable”), incorporating the term that is found in the corporations
statutes in the great majority of states.149 Two more use “unfairly
prejudicial” language that grew out of the involuntary dissolution
context in the corporate setting, usually intended to expand the
reach of judicial action.150 Two other states use “necessary . . . [to
protect] . . . the rights or interests of . . . complaining member[s]”
which also has precedent in the corporate area.151 South Dakota in
2009 moved to the revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
language of “not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s
business with that member,” which suggests a focus on the major
ity’s relationship with the minority member.152 While there has
been some movement toward including a buyout at the request of
the majority shareholder as part of involuntary dissolution statutes
for LLCs, as has already occurred with close corporations,153 the
use of this type of provision is not as widespread as in the corporate
statutes.154
As a South Dakota case makes clear, the language permits dis
solution even where the business could continue despite the parties’
disagreement and deadlock.155 The facts of a Wisconsin case sug
gest how a capital call that is not needed could be oppressive.156
ness with that member); IDAHO CODE § 30-6-70(e) (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/
35-1 (West 2006).
149. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-801; IDAHO CODE § 30-6-70(e); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/35-1.
150. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833(2)(ii) (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 10-32-119(b)(2) (2005).
151. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(a)(2) (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C
6-02(2) (2009).
152. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-8014(ii) (2007).
153. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(b)(1); Dickson v. Rehmke, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874,
879-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (alternative decree issued by the court allowing members to
purchase minority interest in order to avoid dissolution).
154. Provisions in one operating agreement permitting majority interests to over
come dissolution got lost in a tangle of convoluted definitions of similar terms. Ruth v.
Home Health Care of Middle Tenn., LLC, No. E2009-00845-COA-R3_CV, 2010 WL
744936, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2010) (ambiguous operating agreement gets past
summary judgment to show whether dissolution is allowed).
155. Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825, 832 (S.D. 2008) (Meierhenry, J., con
curring) (stalemate can lead to judicial dissolution, as there are few other available
alternatives to handle the deadlock).
156. See generally Lynch v. Carriage Ridge, LLC, 668 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. App.
2003) (judicial dissolution was not appropriate in situation where there was an accusa
tion of a breach of the operating agreement).
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Another case found dissolution provided by the operating agree
ment to be triggered by a member’s bad faith offer.157
Other triggers for involuntary dissolution under LLC statutes
include deadlock in eight states158 and broad generic equitable
grounds in two states.159 In general, LLCs are starting from a posi
tion where the law is more open to a judge being able to grant dis
solution than was true for corporations law a half-century ago, but
not as far along as corporate law has moved currently, where there
is legislative or judicial authority for judicial relief after oppressive
acts in all by a handful of states.160
D. The Role of Contracts in LLCs
While I suggest limits on the willingness to accept the perfec
tion of contracts, or their relative attractiveness as to gap-filling,
this is not to say that there are not differences in sophistication and
ability to use contracts. Indeed, the beginning of a segmentation of
the market can be seen in the pattern of LLC usage. Compare Del
aware’s share of the LLC market to its share of the market for pub
lic corporations and for close corporations generally. Its share of
the public corporation market approaches 60% and it takes 85% or
more of the market for public corporations that incorporate outside
their headquarters state.161 For close corporations, its share is
above its percentage of the national population, but still in the low
single digits of the national market.162 For LLCs, it is in between—

157. Decker v. Decker, 726 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (judicial disso
lution is upheld when triggered by an offer made in bad faith).
158. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A)(2) (1998); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17351(a)(4); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,117(b) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.833(2)(i) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:51(VI) (2005); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 576-6-02(2)(i) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2c-1210(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
159. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-901, 902 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.275
(West 2005).
160. The discussion above draws on Chapter 5 of F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT
B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND
PRACTICE Chapter 5 (Rev. 3d ed. 2010).
161. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incor
porate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 386 (2003).
162. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, The Incorporation Choices of Pri
vately Held Corporations, SOC. SCIENCE RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1049581 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
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at the very top among the states, but overall with a market share
just below double digits.163
Empirical work by Jens Dammann and Matthias Schundeln in
dicates that Delaware does much better in attracting LLCs (and
close corporations) that organize outside the state of their principal
place of business.164 As to those entities with the largest numbers
of employees, Delaware’s share of firms organized under its laws
gets close to its share of public corporations that organize outside of
their principal place of business.165 Dammann & Schundeln suggest
LLCs are more likely to flee for states with more lax governance
structure (measured by duty of care standards and if the majority
can dissolve the corporation).166 Kobayashi and Ribstein, develop
ing a similar data set, find no relation of substantive provisions of
the law of the organizing state and that firms moving from a low
quality state tend to move to another low quality state.167 Both
studies rely on the number of employees as a proxy for size since
neither had access to the number of owners, a size metric more
likely to make a difference for LLC governance provisions.
In the absence of such ownership data, Delaware LLC cases
provide some anecdotal data suggesting Delaware’s attractiveness
to a specific subset of the closely held entity marketplace.168 There
appears to be a pattern of sophisticated investors willing to plan
beyond the statutory default rules and willing to pay for such plan
ning. If this is so, it is not surprising that Delaware is more willing
to permit members to contract around the fiduciary duty of loyalty
and waive the right to petition a court for dissolution.169

163. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, Where are Limited Liability Compa
nies Formed? An Empirical Analysis, SOC. SCIENCE RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1126257 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
164. Id. at 9.
165. Id. A much smaller percentage of LLCs organize outside of their principal
place of business so that Delaware’s overall share of LLCs is lower than its 60% or so
share of publicly-held corporations.
166. Id. at 19.
167. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdic
tional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1431989 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
168. See, e.g., In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259 (Del. Ch. 2008); R &
R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL
3846318 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004).
169. CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASE AND MATERIALS 538 (6th ed. 2010).
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But even in Delaware, its sophisticated judiciary is more than
willing to use fiduciary duty and involuntary dissolution.170 In a
Delaware case where there was deadlock at the board level and no
means around deadlock because of terms intentionally included in
the operating agreement, Chancellor Chandler refused to use fidu
ciary duty to cabin how the parties used their veto power, but nev
ertheless was willing to order dissolution.171 Even where an
agreement provides for an exit mechanism, Vice-Chancellor Strine
ordered dissolution under the statutory “not reasonably practica
ble” standard because the agreement’s mechanism did not relieve
one of the two 50% members of his obligation as a personal guaran
tor for the LLC mortgage.172 “With no reasonable exit mechanism”
the court found the member could “exercise the only practical
deadlock-breaking remedy available to him, and one that is also
alluded to in the LLC agreement, the right to seek judicial
dissolution.”173
CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cases of thirty-five
years ago merit the place at the center of this Symposium, both for
how they changed the law of the closely held firm in the 1970s and
what they can tell us about limited liability companies in the
twenty-first century. Their greatness, however, is not necessarily as
often surmised. Fiduciary duty, partnership attributes, and equal
opportunity remain part of the legacy, but as the law has evolved in
the time since, oppression, reasonable expectations, and buyouts
have taken a more prominent role. Donahue and Wilkes excelled
at defining the problem that gave rise to a variety of possible solu
tions that are still developing. The predicament of the investor in
the closely held business, so clearly set out in Donahue and refined
in Wilkes, thus moved from the academy and some British decisions
into the mainstream of American law where it has remained ever
since.
170. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957, at *7 (Del Ch.
Jan. 13, 2009).
171. Id. at *4-7 (dissolution is appropriate where there is a deadlock without any
mechanism in the operating agreement to circumvent the stalemate).
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2006); Haley, 864 A.2d at 94-98.
173. Haley, 864 A.2d at 88-89 (footnote omitted); see also Connors v. Howe Ele
gant, LLC, No. 4003783, 2009 WL 242324, at *13 (Conn. Super. Jan. 8, 2009) (following
Haley, forcing member to exercise contractual exit would not permit LLC to proceed in
a practicable way).
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In recent years limited liability company law has grown dra
matically, but there remain recurring parallels to how the law of
close corporations developed over the twentieth century. In close
corporations law, the initial hostility to carving out different rules,
or even to enforcing agreements that parties made for their own
governance, gave way to a widespread acceptance of freedom of
contract. But even then, as illustrated in Donahue and Wilkes,
courts recognized that there was a need to provide a judicial failsafe where the parties’ planning left gaps that would defeat parties’
expectations in entering into the legal relationship. In recognizing a
role for involuntary dissolution based on oppression and a greater
recognition of fiduciary duty than was apparent twenty years ago,
LLC law is following in the path of the development of close corpo
ration law. In that journey, too, Donahue and Wilkes provide gui
dance. There will remain differences over the relative roles of
contracts and judges, and that line may divide differently for differ
ent types of LLCs, but the question that the Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court confronted in Donahue and Wilkes will
continue to require both judicial attention and that of the partici
pants in their contracts.

